Decay of the Maxwell field on the Schwarzschild manifold

We study solutions of the decoupled Maxwell equations in the exterior region of a Schwarzschild black hole. In stationary regions, where the Schwarzschild coordinate $r$ ranges over $2M < r_1 < r < r_2$, we obtain a decay rate of $t^{-1}$ for all components of the Maxwell field. We use vector field methods and do not require a spherical harmonic decomposition. In outgoing regions, where the Regge-Wheeler tortoise coordinate is large, $r_*>\epsilon t$, we obtain decay for the null components with rates of $|\phi_+| \sim |\alpha| < C r^{-5/2}$, $|\phi_0| \sim |\rho| + |\sigma| < C r^{-2} |t-r_*|^{-1/2}$, and $|\phi_{-1}| \sim |\underline{\alpha}| < C r^{-1} |t-r_*|^{-1}$. Along the event horizon and in ingoing regions, where $r_*<0$, and when $t+r_*1$, all components (normalized with respect to an ingoing null basis) decay at a rate of C \uout^{-1} with \uout=t+r_* in the exterior region.Comment: 37 pages, 5 figure

Self-Similar Scalar Field Collapse: Naked Singularities and Critical Behaviour

Homothetic scalar field collapse is considered in this article. By making a suitable choice of variables the equations are reduced to an autonomous system. Then using a combination of numerical and analytic techniques it is shown that there are two classes of solutions. The first consists of solutions with a non-singular origin in which the scalar field collapses and disperses again. There is a singularity at one point of these solutions, however it is not visible to observers at finite radius. The second class of solutions includes both black holes and naked singularities with a critical evolution (which is neither) interpolating between these two extremes. The properties of these solutions are discussed in detail. The paper also contains some speculation about the significance of self-similarity in recent numerical studies.Comment: 27 pages including 5 encapsulated postcript figures in separate compressed file, report NCL94-TP1

Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games

We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria, have low cost, i.e. the Bayesian Price of Anarchy (PoA) is minimized. Although budget balance is a very natural requirement, it puts considerable restrictions on the design space, resulting in high PoA. We propose an alternative, relaxed requirement called budget balance in the equilibrium (BBiE).We show an interesting connection between algorithms for Oblivious Stochastic optimization problems and cost-sharing design with low PoA. We exploit this connection for both problems and we enforce approximate solutions of the stochastic problem, as Bayesian Nash equilibria, with the same guarantees on the PoA. More interestingly, we show how to obtain the same bounds on the PoA, by using anonymous posted prices which are desirable because they are easy to implement and, as we show, induce dominant strategies for the players

On Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context

We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework, given a real matrix $\Gamma=(\gamma_{ij})$ specifying a particular social context, each player $i$ aims at optimizing a linear combination of the payoffs of all the players in the game, where, for each player $j$, the multiplicative coefficient is given by the value $\gamma_{ij}$. We give a broad characterization of the social contexts for which pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist and provide tight or almost tight bounds on their prices of anarchy and stability. In some of the considered cases, our achievements either improve or extend results previously known in the literature

On the Impact of Fair Best Response Dynamics

In this work we completely characterize how the frequency with which each player participates in the game dynamics affects the possibility of reaching efficient states, i.e., states with an approximation ratio within a constant factor from the price of anarchy, within a polynomially bounded number of best responses. We focus on the well known class of congestion games and we show that, if each player is allowed to play at least once and at most $\beta$ times any $T$ best responses, states with approximation ratio $O(\beta)$ times the price of anarchy are reached after $T \lceil \log \log n \rceil$ best responses, and that such a bound is essentially tight also after exponentially many ones. One important consequence of our result is that the fairness among players is a necessary and sufficient condition for guaranteeing a fast convergence to efficient states. This answers the important question of the maximum order of $\beta$ needed to fast obtain efficient states, left open by [9,10] and [3], in which fast convergence for constant $\beta$ and very slow convergence for $\beta=O(n)$ have been shown, respectively. Finally, we show that the structure of the game implicitly affects its performances. In particular, we show that in the symmetric setting, in which all players share the same set of strategies, the game always converges to an efficient state after a polynomial number of best responses, regardless of the frequency each player moves with

Global existence problem in T3T^3-Gowdy symmetric IIB superstring cosmology

We show global existence theorems for Gowdy symmetric spacetimes with type IIB stringy matter. The areal and constant mean curvature time coordinates are used. Before coming to that, it is shown that a wave map describes the evolution of this system

Best Approximation to a Reversible Process in Black-Hole Physics and the Area Spectrum of Spherical Black Holes

The assimilation of a quantum (finite size) particle by a Reissner-Nordstr\"om black hole inevitably involves an increase in the black-hole surface area. It is shown that this increase can be minimized if one considers the capture of the lightest charged particle in nature. The unavoidable area increase is attributed to two physical reasons: the Heisenberg quantum uncertainty principle and a Schwinger-type charge emission (vacuum polarization). The fundamental lower bound on the area increase is $4 \hbar$, which is smaller than the value given by Bekenstein for neutral particles. Thus, this process is a better approximation to a reversible process in black-hole physics. The universality of the minimal area increase is a further evidence in favor of a uniformly spaced area spectrum for spherical quantum black holes. Moreover, this universal value is in excellent agreement with the area spacing predicted by Mukhanov and Bekenstein and independently by Hod.Comment: 10 page

Quantum Creation of Black Hole by Tunneling in Scalar Field Collapse

Continuously self-similar solution of spherically symmetric gravitational collapse of a scalar field is studied to investigate quantum mechanical black hole formation by tunneling in the subcritical case where, classically, the collapse does not produce a black hole.Comment: t clarification of the quantization method in Sec. IV, version to appear in PR

Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of Coordination Mechanisms. We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if $\ell_e(x)$ is the latency function of an edge $e$, we replace it by $\hat{\ell}_e(x)$ with $\ell_e(x) \le \hat{\ell}_e(x)$ for all $x$. Then an adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Price of Anarchy of the mechanism is defined as the worst-case ratio of the Nash social cost in the modified network over the optimal social cost in the original network. Formally, if \CM(r) denotes the cost of the worst Nash flow in the modified network for rate $r$ and \Copt(r) denotes the cost of the optimal flow in the original network for the same rate then [\ePoA = \max_{r \ge 0} \frac{\CM(r)}{\Copt(r)}.] We first exhibit a simple coordination mechanism that achieves for any network of parallel links an engineered Price of Anarchy strictly less than 4/3. For the case of two parallel links our basic mechanism gives 5/4 = 1.25. Then, for the case of two parallel links, we describe an optimal mechanism; its engineered Price of Anarchy lies between 1.191 and 1.192.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, preliminary version appeared at ESA 201

Search for dark matter in events containing jets and missing transverse momentum using ratio measurements

This thesis presents a measurement of missing transverse momentum in association with jets at √s = 13 TeV with 3.2 fb⁻¹ of proton-proton collisions at the LHC, collected in 2015 using the ATLAS detector. In the Standard Model of particle physics, this is the experimental signature of Z boson production in association with jets, where the Z boson decays to neutrinos, however it could also be the signature of dark matter production in association with jets. A ratio can be formed using events containing oppositely charged same-flavour lepton pairs in association with jets, consistent with the decay of a Z/γ* boson. Detector inefficiencies can be accounted for by defining a correction factor and applying it to the ratio in order to recover the lost events. The detector-corrected ratio is measured differentially with respect to four variables in two jet phase spaces. The measured ratios are consistent with the Standard Model prediction and the data are used to place limits on the production of dark matter in proton-proton collisions at the LHC on three models, an effective field theory model, a simplified model with an axial-vector mediator, and the production of an invisibly decaying Higgs boson. In addition, the ATLAS trigger system has been upgraded for the 2015 data taking and a new jet reconstruction algorithm has been developed for the updated jet trigger software. Diagnostic algorithms have been developed to test the new software and its validation has been automated using a new jet trigger validation package. The new jet triggers perform as expected and their performance has been evaluated using the full 2015 dataset